It’s a good idea to update your GPG key(s) before they expire. Mine is set to expire year, from whence I last updated the expiration. Let’s explore how this is done!

Info

If the reader is unfamiliar with OpenPGP, it’s suggested to check out the prior write-up on this blog: OpenPGP Best Practices (and Git)

Importing Secret Keys

Personally, my secret (primary) key is not kept on any device. It’s stored, and backed up in encrypted external media devices (USB, etc.) only to be imported when keys require editing.

Mounting Secure Device (LUKS)

This is done using cryptsetup and Linux Unified Key Setup1 (LUKS) for encryption. Plugging in my USB device and mounting it requires only one additional step. Instead of initially running mount /dev/sdXN we first must “open” the encrypted drive via:

cryptsetup --type luks open /dev/sdXN encryptedusb
The encryptedusb name is a user-specified friendly name that has no relevance to accessing the drive

Now the device can be mounted to a directory, but not via the /dev/sdXN device – rather the /dev/mapper/encryptedusb device (or whatever friendly name you gave it).

mount /dev/mapper/encryptedusb /mnt/media

Backing up the Keys

Once the device has been securely mounted, it’s a good idea to either export the keys currently in the keyring or back-up the entire ~/.gnupg directory. The backup created will be stored on the previously mounted external media device.

GPG Key Export Backup

It’s as simple as exporting the secret key, which will also contain your public key:

gpg --armor --export-secret-key your@email.address > /mnt/media/some/dir/secretkey.gpg.bak

GPG Directory Backup (optional)

This isn’t entirely necessary, though it’s never a bad idea to create a hard back-up of the directory – just don’t forget to remove it after!

cp ~/.gnupg /mnt/media/some/backup/dir/.gnupg.bak
Note: If the ~/.gnupg.bak directory already exists, the above command will copy it to ~/gnupg.bak/.gnupg!

Import and Update Expiration

Now that back-ups have been taken care of, the current keyring can either be emptied, deleted, or simply worked with. That’s up to the user.

Import

In any event, the next step ultimately becomes importing the secret (primary) key:

gpg --import /mnt/media/some/backup/dir/secretprimarykey.gpg

Verify the presence of the primary secret key, noting no presence of sec# in the output indicating only a partially stripped secret key, via:

gpg --list-secret-keys

--------------------------------
sec  rsa4096 2017-11-21 [SC] [expires: 2021-02-16]
...

Update

Updating the primary secret key and all it’s sub keys is done via gpg in the following manner:

gpg --edit-key your@email.address

gpg> key 0
gpg> expire
...
Key is valid for? (0) 1y
Is this correct? (y/N) y

gpg> key 1
gpg> expire
Key is valid for? (0) 1y
Is this correct? (y/N) y

gpg> key 2
gpg> expire
Key is valid for? (0) 1y
Is this correct? (y/N) y

gpg> save

At this point, it’s a good idea to send the key to the key server:

gpg --send-keys your@email.address
# or
gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --send-keys your@email.address

Cleanup

Now it’s time to export the primary key and it’s sub keys to the encrypted external media device:

gpg --armor --export-secret-key your@email.address > /mnt/media/some/dir/secretkey.gpg
gpg --armor --export-secret-subkeys your@email.address > /mnt/media/some/dir/secretsubkey.gpg

Then, delete the primary secret key from your keyring and import only the secret sub-key:

gpg --delete-secret-keys your@email.address
# reply 'yes' to the prompts as needed
gpg --import /mnt/media/some/dir/secretsubkey.gpg

Verification

Once only the secret sub-key has been imported from the previous step, it should be verified that the primary secret key is not in your keyring (partial stripped key designated via sec# in the following):

gpg --list-secret-keys

--------------------------------
sec#  rsa4096 2017-11-21 [SC] [expires: 2021-02-16]
...
Note: sec# is what we are looking for. If it is indicated as only sec then the primary secret key is still in the keyring! Repeat the prior steps to attempt this again should you have to, but do so carefully.

Unmounting

Lastly, remember to remove any local back-ups of the keyring or keys you stored on the host! These should only exist on the encrypted external device.

To un-mount the LUKS1 encrypted device, it’s just one additional step to the usual umount:

umount /mnt/media
cryptsetup --type luks close encryptedusb

That being done, it is safe to remove the external device!

OpenKeychain Export & Import

Provided the reader is on an Android device, it can be mounted onto the local host using simple-mtpfs.

Mounting Android Device

First, plug in the Android device via a suitable USB cable to the local host and set the USB managed option to “File Transfer” on the Android device. After this the device should be mountable:

simple-mtpfs -l
1: Google IncNexus/Pixel (MTP)

simple-mtpfs --device 1 /mnt/android

Export Secret Key

Once the device is mounted, we want to export the partially stripped key (not the primary key) to be imported using OpenKeychain on the Android device. The next steps quote from the OpenKeychain FAQ:

# generate a strong random password
gpg --armor --gen-random 1 20

# encrypt key, use password above when asked
gpg --armor --export-secret-keys YOUREMAILADDRESS | gpg --armor --symmetric --output /mnt/android/Downloads/mykey.sec.asc

Import it in OpenKeychain (may require deletion in OpenKeychain first – make sure not to revoke and delete!) and we’re done!


  1. guardianproject.info/archive/luks/ ↩︎